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I. INTRODUCTION
A pretrial detention1 can be devastating to an innocent party
forced to sit in jail awaiting their day in court.2 A way to decrease
this devastating risk is to ensure that only prosecutions likely to
result in a conviction will result in long-term pretrial incarceration.
The importance of a speedy trial is demonstrated by the media
frenzy related to Kalief Browder, who was arrested as a sixteen-
year-old based on a questionable identification, spent three years in
the Rikers Island Jail awaiting trial, and attempted to commit sui-
cide multiple times during his confinement.3 Browder was arrested
based on a single identification by the victim, was identified two
weeks after the robbery, and the police did not recover any physical
evidence.4 Browder's family believed his mental condition was
worn down so greatly during his confinement that he tragically
committed suicide after his release.5 Browder's case stresses the
importance of making an accurate pretrial determination of guilt to
ensure only those who are most dangerous and likely to have com-
mitted crime endure pretrial detention.6 An accurate pretrial de-
termination of guilt likely could have screened out cases like
Browder's that are unlikely to result in a conviction. This article
will discuss the constitutional and statutory protections for pretrial
detention. Next, it will discuss major problems facing Pennsylva-
nia's pretrial detention scheme. Finally, it will advocate that Penn-
sylvania's current pretrial detention regime, which is based on the
Fourth Amendment, does not adequately provide protection against
unnecessary confinement.
1. Pretrial detention is defined as: "holding a defendant prior to his trial on criminal
charges either because he cannot post the established bail or because he has been denied
pretrial release under a pretrial detention statute." Pretrial detention, BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 155 (6th ed. 2010).
2. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
3. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A Boy Was Accused of Taking a Backpack. The
Courts Took the Next Three Years of His Life, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law.
4. Id.
5. Peter Holley, KaliefBrowder Hanged Himself After Jail Destroyed Him. Then 'a Bro-
ken Heart' Killed His Mother, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/18/kalief-browder-hanged-himself-after-jail-de-
stroyed-him-then-a-broken-heart-killed-his-mother/?utmterm=. 7969df42d586.
6. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE PROTECTIONS AGAINST
PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT
Current legal protections against unlawful confinement are
largely rooted in the Fourth Amendment.7 The Fourth Amendment
requires both arrests and subsequent long-term detentions to be
based on probable cause.8 Courts prefer that arrests are made after
a neutral and detached magistrate determines there is probable
cause for an arrest rather than relying on the judgment of a police
officer in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."9 How-
ever, while there is a preference that arrests be made with a war-
rant signed by a magistrate,10 the vast majority of arrests are made
pursuant to a warrantless, on-the-scene finding of probable cause
by a police officer." Exceptions to the ordinary arrest warrant re-
quirement are premised upon the practical consideration that when
time is of the essence, applying for an arrest warrant takes a con-
siderable amount of time and may result in the suspect getting
away.12 But once a suspect is in custody and there is no longer any
risk of escape from law enforcement a magistrate's probable cause
determination is necessary.13
In the seminal case on pretrial detention, Gerstein v. Pugh, the
United States Supreme Court determined the constitutional re-
quirements for pretrial procedures.1 4 Prior to this decision, individ-
uals in Florida, where this case was decided, could be arrested
solely based on police discretion, i.e. arrested without a warrant,
and faced the possibility of being detained for significant periods of
time prior to their trial without ever having an opportunity to chal-
lenge the existence of the probable cause resulting in their arrest.15
Before Gerstein, prosecutors in Florida were only required to file an
7. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
8. Id. at 111. Probable cause is defined as: "the existence of facts and circumstances
within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient
in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a crime has been
committed." Probable cause, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (6th ed. 2010).
9. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
10. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
11. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14.
12. Id. at 114.
13. Id.
14. See generally Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103.
15. Id. at 116.
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information16 to detain individuals prior to trial.17 Prosecutors for
the State of Florida asserted the mere act of filing an information
was a sufficient determination of probable cause to justify incarcer-
ation for the entire period of time from arrest until trial.1 8
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment requires that within forty-eight hours of a
warrantless arrest a neutral and detached party must determine
that probable cause xisted for the arrest in order to justify further
detention.19 The Court recognized how pretrial detention is often
more intrusive than the actual arrest because a suspect risks losing
their job, their source(s) of income, and disruption to their family.20
The Supreme Court found that a prosecutor filing an information
was insufficient to justify long-term incarceration because the pros-
ecutor's law enforcement responsibilities are "inconsistent with the
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate."21
The Court also found defendants are not entitled to representa-
tion by an attorney because probable cause d terminations are not
adversarial.22 Defense counsel is only required at "critical stages"
in a criminal proceeding.23 A proceeding is considered critical only
if there is a chance of losing or sacrificing a constitutional right or
impairing the defendant's defense; here, the Court found that prob-
able cause defendants do not risk losing constitutional rights and
consequently do not require representation.24 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court encouraged states to experiment with different types
of probable cause determinations,25 such as allowing procedures
16. Information is defined as: "a written accusation of a crime signed by the prosecutor,
charging a person with the commission of a crime; an alternative to indictment as a means
of starting a criminal prosecution." Information, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (6th ed.
2010).
17. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116-17.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 103.
20. Id. at 114.
21. Id. at 117; see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348 (1972) (holding
"someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine probable cause").
22. Gerstein, 420 U.S at 123.
23. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
24. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); see, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 659 (1984) (opining that the trial is a critical stage where defendants must have the
opportunity for representation); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (establishing
defendants must have the opportunity to be represented during sentencing); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967) (recognizing pretrial lineups are critical stages); Mas-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding pretrial questioning while charged
with a crime is a critical stage); Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54 (finding an arraignment where an
insanity defense must be pleaded is a critical stage).
25. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123-24.
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like arraignmentS26 and initial bail determinationS27 to occur at the
same time. Finally, while only a single probable cause determina-
tion is necessary, jurisdictions can provide greater protection than
what is required by the Fourth Amendment by providing multiple
pretrial determinations.28
A. Types of Probable Cause Determinations
There is no single preferred pretrial procedure for determining
probable cause.29 Different types of pretrial procedures allow exper-
imentation and flexibility for states.30 Common procedures include
arrest warrants issued by a magistrate or judge,31 indicting grand
juries,32 and non-adversarial probable cause determinations in
front of a magistrate, known as Gerstein hearings.33
1. Arrest Warrant
Arrest warrants are generally used when police officers have the
luxury of time before an arrest must be made.34 An arrest warrant
may be issued upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate.35
The arrest warrant is requested by the affiant, usually a police of-
ficer, in an affidavit of probable cause.36 Affidavits of probable
cause must be approved by magistrates.37 Despite the requirement
for only minimal legal training,38 a magistrate's "determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
26. Arraignment is defined as the "initial step in the criminal process wherein the de-
fendant is formally charged with an offense, i.e., given a copy of the complaint or other accu-
satory instrument, and informed of his or her constitutional rights . Arraignment,
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 35 (6th ed. 2010).
27. Bail is defined as: "a hearing to determine if a monetary or other form of security
may be given to "insure the appearance of the defendant at every state of the proceedings."
Bail, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (6th ed. 2010).
28. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123-24. Pennsylvania requires a finding of probable cause dur-
ing a preliminary arraignment, PA. R. CRIM. P. 540, and a prima facie finding of guilt. PA. R.
CRIM. P. 542.
29. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
30. Id.
31. PA. R. CRIM. P. 513.
32. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1972).
33. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103.
34. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 n.22 (1976) (recognizing that an incentive
for using search warrants is that the police may continue to collect evidence without penalty
if a magistrate initially refuses to sign a search warrant).
35. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 345 n..
36. Id.
37. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234-35 (1983).
38. 201 PA. CODE 601 (2015). In Pennsylvania, you do not need to be a member of the
bar or even have a law degree to become a magistrate. Id. Magistrates who are not lawyers
must pass a Minor Judiciary test and take continuing legal education. Id.
173
Duquesne Law Review
courts."3 9 Therefore, the use of search warrants by police officers is
incentivized by the courts as reviewing courts give the magistrates'
judgment deference.40 If magistrates' judgment and analysis of af-
fidavits of probable cause were heavily scrutinized, "police might
well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on con-
sent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might de-
velop at the time of the search."4 1
2. Grand Jury
Federal constitutional rights require that a grand jury4 2 find the
existence of probable cause for all criminal indictments.4 3 The right
to a grand jury only exists for federal criminal prosecutions; the
right to a grand jury indictment is not selectively incorporated4 4 and
thus states are not required to use grand juries.45 Historically,
grand juries:
[Deliberate] in secret and may determine alone the course of
its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evi-
dence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate,
and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical
procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of
criminal trials. It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of in-
vestigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not
to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether
any particular individual will be found properly subject to an
accusation of crime.46
39. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
40. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 n.22 (1976).
41. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
42. Grand jury is defined as: "a body of people drawn, selected, and summoned according
to law to serve as a constituent part of a court of criminal jurisdiction." Grand jury, BARRON'S
LAW DICTIONARY 239-40 (6th ed. 2010). The purpose of the body "is to investigate and inform
on crimes committed within its jurisdiction and to accuse persons of crimes when it has dis-
covered sufficient evidence to warrant holding a person for a trial." Id.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The founders of the United States believed grand juries were
essential to preventing "arbitrary and oppressive" government action. United States v. Cal-
andra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974). Consequently, grand juries are given wide latitude in
both investigating crime and determining the existence of probable cause. Id.
44. Selective incorporation is defined as: "the process by which certain [] guarantees ex-
pressed in the Bill of Rights become applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Selective incorporation, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 490 (6th ed. 2010).
45. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (citing Hurtado v. Peoples, 110 U.S. 516,
538 (1884)).
46. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
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Grand juries are seen as a way of protecting individuals against
"arbitrary and oppressive governmental action."47 Because a grand
jury's deliberations are secret, they are able to avoid many of the
inconveniences of a public hearing.48 Pennsylvania currently al-
lows indicting grand juries, but only in limited circumstances.49
Grand juries are only used when witness intimidation has already
occurred.5 0 In that case, a common pleas judge must petition the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for permission to use a grand
jury.5 1 Moreover, the use of the grand jury recognizes the inconven-
ience of testifying in a criminal trial and the dangerous conse-
quences of witness intimidation.52
3. Gerstein Hearings
A Gerstein Hearing refers to a probable cause determination that
is required to occur after a warrantless arrest.5 3 An influential Yale
Law Review article, published before the decision in Gerstein v.
Pugh, theorized an analytical framework splitting these types of
probable cause determination procedures into two categories: back-
ward looking procedures and forward looking procedures.5 4
a) Backward Looking Model
The backward looking model's "primary concern is with the legal-
ity of the arrest and the validity of the detention of the arrested
person."5 5 Under this model, evidence is presented to a magistrate
in the form of affidavit5 6 and cannot be challenged by the defend-
ant.5 7 These procedures are more akin to a request for an arrest
warrant rather than an actual trial because of the factual, rather
than legal inquiry, the court makes.5 8 The backward looking model
47. Id. at 342-43.
48. Id. at 343. The secret nature of grand jury proceedings avoids the embarrassing
stigma of being accused of a crime publically. Id. Further, it allows investigation into inci-
dents when it is not entirely clear a crime even occurred. Id.
49. PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 103 (1975).
54. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J.
771, 774 (1974).
55. Id. at 775.
56. Affidavit is defined as a "written, ex parte statement made or taken under oath before
an officer of the court." Affidavit, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 18 (6th ed. 2010).
57. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 776.
58. Id.
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is not subject to formal rules of evidence and normally inadmissible
evidence like hearsay59 is considered in determining if probable
cause exists.60 Ultimately, these types of procedures are meant to
screen out types of illegal detentions61 such as: (1) good faith, but
still illegal arrests; (2) knowingly illegal arrests; and (3) legal ar-
rests where later evidence reveals the arrestee's innocence.62
b) Forward Looking Model
The forward looking conceptual model inquires into whether
there is "sufficient probability of conviction" to warrant further
criminal proceedings.63 This model envisions that cases unlikely to
succeed on their merits can be screened out at an early stage.64 Un-
der this model, evidence would be presented to a magistrate who
would be required to determine if there was a legal and factual basis
for the criminal charges.65 If the prosecution successfully demon-
strates a basis for the charges, the magistrate could hold the
charges over for trial.66 Because the goal is to determine if a case
would be successful at trial, the forward looking model would not
consider hearsay or other evidence likely to be inadmissible at
trial.67 A forward looking probable cause determination would re-
semble a trial in that a defendant has the right to counsel, to cross-
59. Hearsay is defined as:
a rule that declares not admissible as evidence any statement other than that by a
witness while testifying as the hearing and offered into evidence to prove the truth of
the matter stated. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the credibility of the witness
is the key ingredient in weighing the truth of this statement; so when that statement
is made out of court, without benefit of cross-examination and without the witness's
demeanor being subject to assessment by the trier of fact, there is generally not ade-
quate basis for determining whether the out-of-court statement is true.
Hearsay, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 2010).
60. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 778. Pennsylvania's preliminary arraignment is an example of a Backward Looking
probable cause determination. See discussion infra 1. Backward Looking - Preliminary Ar-
raignment.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592 (1975) (demonstrating where detectives
acknowledged an arrest was made, not based on probable cause, but solely for the purpose of
questioning an individual during a murder investigation).
63. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 778.
64. Id. at 781.
65. Id. at 782.
66. Id. at 781. Holding charges for trial means the charged crimes can be tried at trial.
Id. Pennsylvania's preliminary hearing is an example of a Forward Looking probable cause
determination. See discussion infra 2. Forward Looking - Preliminary Hearing.
67. Id. at 779-80.
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examine witnesses, and to present affirmative defenses on his be-
half.68
B. Pennsylvania's Pretrial Procedures
While the United States Constitution only requires a single prob-
able cause determination prior to trial,69 Pennsylvania provides two
separate guilt determinations.70 The first, a preliminary arraign-
ment, is an ex parte procedure occurring shortly after the arrest
where a magistrate determines if probable cause exists.7 1 The pre-
liminary arraignment has many of the characteristics of the back-
ward looking model procedure.72 The second, a preliminary hear-
ing, is an adversarial procedure which mimics some of the proce-
dures of an actual trial.73 The preliminary hearing shares many of
the similarities of the forward looking model procedure.74
1. Backward Looking - Preliminary Arraignment
Pennsylvania's preliminary arraignment is similar to a backward
looking procedure.7 5 In Pennsylvania, defendants arrested without
a warrant are given a probable cause determination within forty-
eight hours of being arrested.7 6 This procedure is described in
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 540.77 The com-
ment to Rule 540 explains that the preliminary arraignment fulfills
the Gerstein probable cause requirement that a probable cause de-
termination be made by a neutral and disinterested magistrate
within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest.7 8
Pennsylvania's preliminary arraignment, as proscribed in Penn-
sylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 540, combines many necessary
pretrial procedures. Necessary pretrial procedures includes pre-
senting the arrestee with the criminal complaint.79 If the defendant
is arrested with an arrest warrant, they are provided with both the
68. Id. Under the forward looking model, the credibility of witnesses would be at issue
since the goal is to test if the case would likely succeed under trial like conditions. Id. at 784.
69. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126.
70. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540; PA. R. CRIM. P. 542.
71. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540.
72. See discussion supra a) Backward Looking Model.
73. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542.
74. See discussion supra b) Forward Looking Model.
75. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540; The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Pro-
cedure, supra note 54, at 775.
76. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540; see Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
77. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540.
78. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540 cmt.; see Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56.
79. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(C).
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warrant and the affidavit of probable cause used to obtain the ar-
rest warrant.80 If a warrantless arrest occurs, a Gerstein hearing,
probable cause determination is made.81 Whether a warrant was
issued or not, the magistrate will inform the defendant of the right
to secure counsel, the right to have a preliminary hearing, and the
opportunity to post bail.82
2. Forward Looking - Preliminary Hearing
Pennsylvania's preliminary hearing is a forward looking proce-
dure because it is meant to prove the Commonwealth has a realistic
chance of succeeding on the merits of its case at trial.83 The purpose
of the preliminary hearing is to protect accused individuals from
unlawful detention.84 Preliminary hearings must be scheduled to
occur within fourteen days of an arrest if the defendant is incarcer-
ated and twenty-one days if the defendant posted bail.85
The Commonwealth is required to establish a prima facie case
against the defendant to show the crime was committed by the ac-
cused.86 Prima facie is a standard lower than reasonable doubt,87
but still high enough that a reasonable jury could find each element
of the offense.88 Probable cause merely requires a showing of "facts
and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at
the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a
crime."89 However, a prima facie showing of guilt requires a show-
ing of "each of the material elements of the crime charged" and the
"existence of facts which connect the accused to the crime
charged."90 Hearsay evidence is admissible at a preliminary hear-
ing and the Commonwealth may introduce hearsay evidence to
meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case.91 There is no
80. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(D).
81. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(E).
82. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(F).
83. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542; The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Pro-
cedure, supra note 54, at 779.
84. Commonwealth v. Ruza, 511 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. 1986).
85. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540.
86. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542.
87. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18, 20 (1994) (finding reasonable doubt is "such a
doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more im-
portant transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true
and relying and acting thereon").
88. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1983).
89. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. 1991).
90. Commonwealth ex. rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. 1990).
91. Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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constitutional right, federal or state, to a preliminary hearing.92 As
will be later discussed, the justification for requiring a second pre-
trial procedure in the form of a preliminary hearing is eroding away
and, as it currently stands, it no longer demonstrates the prosecu-
tion's chance of succeeding on the merits of the case.93
III. CURRENT PROBLEMS FACING PENNSYLVANIA'S
PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
Pennsylvania's preliminary arraignment fulfills the federal con-
stitutional obligation to make a determination of probable cause in
warrantless arrests.94 However, the preliminary hearing no longer
fulfills the goal of ensuring only meritorious cases reach trial.95 Ra-
ther, the preliminary hearing has become redundant to the prelim-
inary arraignment and acts as a prosecutorial rubberstamp. After
discussing the problems facing Pennsylvania's preliminary arraign-
ments and preliminary hearings, this article will propose certain
reforms that can hopefully make these pretrial procedures more ef-
ficient for weeding out bad criminal cases.
A. Admission of Hearsay Evidence
In Commonwealth v. Ricker, the Pennsylvania Superior Court de-
cided the Confrontation Clause is not violated where the prosecu-
tion proves a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing through
hearsay alone.96 The Confrontation Clause is encompassed in the
Sixth Amendment and states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . .be confronted with the witnesses
against him." 9 7 The Confrontation Clause is meant to guarantee
open and fair trials "by ensuring that convictions will not be based
on the charges of unseen and unknown-and hence unchallengea-
ble-individuals."98 Other jurisdictions analyzing this issue have
found that the federal Confrontation Clause does not apply to pre-
liminary hearings.99
92. Commonwealth v. Ruza, 511 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. 1986) (citing Commonwealth v. May-
berry, 327 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1974); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
93. PA. R. CRIM. P. 540; see generally Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S., 44, 56 (1991).
94. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
95. Id.
96. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. 2015).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
98. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
99. See, e.g., State v. Tillerman, 218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009); State v. Rivera, 192 P.3d
1213, 1218 (N.M. 2008); Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 145 P.3d 1002, 1003 (Nev. 2006); State v.
Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635, 641 (N.D. 2006); State v. Sherry, 667 P.2d 367, 376 (Kan.
1983); State v. Jones, 259 S.E.2d 120, 122 (S.C. 1979); People v. Felder, 129 P.3d 1072, 1074
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Commonwealth v. Ricker demonstrates the consequences of not
requiring confrontation at the preliminary hearing.100 David Ed-
ward Ricker was charged with attempted murder, assault of a law
enforcement officer, and aggravated assault stemming from a
shootout with police.101 Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Trotta
was dispatched to Ricker's West Hanover home after a truck,
known to be driven by Ricker, allegedly ran over a neighbor's mail-
box and lawn ornament.102 Ricker's wife opened the family's drive-
way gate and consented for the officers to enter their driveway.103
Trooper Trotta was warned that Ricker was drunk and carrying a
gun but proceeded to drive up to the home where he was confronted
by Ricker.1 0 4 Ricker demanded Trooper Trotta leave the prem-
ises.105 At one point Trooper Trotta drew his taser and Ricker
slammed the police car door, preventing Trooper Trotta from exit-
ing the vehicle.106 When Trooper Trotta did leave the vehicle,
Ricker drew a handgun.107 Another Pennsylvania state trooper,
Trooper Gingerich, then arrived on the scene.108 Ricker proceeded
to retreat to his garage where he procured an assault rifle.109 Troop-
ers Trotta and Gingerich drew their guns and demanded Ricker
drop his rifle.110 Ricker refused to comply with the officers' com-
mands.111 Trooper Trotta entered the garage where he saw Ricker
leveling a rifle towards him.112 Trooper Trotta then shot Ricker
twice with his handgun.113 Ricker fell to the ground, returned fire,
and shot Trooper Trotta multiple times.1 1 4
Neither Trooper Trotta or Gingerich, the only officers with first-
hand knowledge of the event, testified at the preliminary hear-
ing.115 The Commonwealth was likely trying to insulate Trooper
Trotta from cross examination. Trooper Trotta was investigated by
a grand jury for shooting Ricker, though he was ultimately
(Colo. App. 2005); Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); State v.
Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
100. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 353.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 351.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 352.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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absolved, because his actions arguably escalated the situation and
caused an unnecessary shooting.116 Trooper Trotta also had a his-
tory of police misconduct which the prosecution likely was trying to
avoid, including a September 2013 incident where the state police
settled a lawsuit alleging Trooper Trotta strip-searched a man
without securing a search warrant.117 Additionally, on May 16,
2015 Trooper Trotta was involved in a recorded incident, where a
skateboarder was beaten after standing in a roadway and giving
the officers the middle finger.118 As a result of this incident of police
brutality, Trotta's employment as a trooper was terminated for an
unrelated "internal affair" and his partner was charged with official
oppression, simple assault, and harassment.119 Because of these
questionable incidents involving Trooper Trotta, the prosecution
was likely trying to avoid scrutiny of his behavior during Ricker's
prosecution.
Instead of Trooper Trotta testifying at the preliminary hearing,
the prosecution called Trooper Douglas Kelly who did not witness
any first-hand criminal conduct, but instead testified about his sec-
ond-hand investigation of the shooting and played for the magiste-
rial district court a tape of an interview with Trooper Trotta.120
Based solely on the hearsay evidence provided by Trooper Kelly of
the event and the taped interview, the magistrate found a prima
facie showing of facts for the charges and bound the case for trial.121
In response, Ricker filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus122 which
the trial court denied.123 Ricker alleged he was denied his constitu-
tional right to confront his witnesses because he was only able to
cross-examine Trooper Kelly, but not able to cross-examine the
taped statement made by Trooper Trotta. Ricker then appealed to
the Pennsylvania Superior Court.124 Ricker alleged the current
rules of Pennsylvania Criminal procedure violated his
116. See Matt Miller, Man Who Was Strip-Searched Settles Excessive Force Lawsuit
Against Fired State Trooper, PATRIOT-NEWS (Aug. 16, 2016, 11:30 AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/08/man-who-was-strip-searchedset.html.
117. Id.
118. See Michael Tanenbaum, Pennsylvania Trooper Charged in Recorded Beating of
Skater, PHILLY VOICE (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.phillyvoice.com/pa-trooper-charged-beat-
ing-skater-after-obscene-gesture/.
119. Id.
120. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
121. Id.
122. Habeas corpus is defined as a challenge "for obtaining a judicial determination of the
legality of an individual's custody. Technically, it is used in the criminal law context to bring
the petitioner before the court to inquire into the legality of his confinement." Habeas corpus,
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (6th ed. 2010).
123. Ricker, 120 A.3d at 352.
124. Id.
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confrontation rights under both the state and federal constitu-
tions.125 Specifically, Rule 542 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure regarding hearsay provides:
[h]earsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing
authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been
established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish
any element of an offense, including, but not limited to, those
requiring proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, dam-
age to, or value of property.126
The comment to Rule 542 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure further clarifies the extent to which hearsay is used:
[t]raditionally our courts have not applied the law of evidence
in its full rigor in proceedings such as preliminary hearings,
especially with regard to the use of hearsay to establish the
elements of a prima facie case. See the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence generally, but in particular, Article VIII. Accordingly,
hearsay, whether written or oral, may establish the elements
of any offense. The presence of witnesses to establish these el-
ements is not required at the preliminary hearing. But com-
pare Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d
172 (Pa. 1990) (plurality) (disapproving reliance on hearsay
testimony as the sole basis for establishing a prima facie
case).127
Ricker primarily relied1 28 upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
plurality decision in Commonwealth v. ex rel. Buchanan v. Ver-
bonitz to argue that the prosecution could not solely use hearsay
evidence to advance past the preliminary hearing stage.129 The
125. Id.
126. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542(E).
127. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542. cmt.
128. Brief for the Appellee at 10-11, Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 A.3d 175 (2016) (No.
1693).
129. Commonwealth ex. rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 174-75 (Pa. 1990) (plu-
rality). Bill Cosby, former stand-up comedian and actor, raised a similar argument at a pre-
liminary hearing in Pennsylvania where he is accused of rape. Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10-11, Commonwealth v. Cosby, 2016 WL
4254264 (2016) (No. CP-46-MD-3156-2015). Cosby's defense attorney described the testi-
mony of the victim which was read by a criminal investigator as: "[a]fter hearing the weak,
inconsistent and incredible evidence presented, it is clear why the prosecution did not allow
its witness to speak and be confronted by the person she has accused. Instead, they chose to
rely on an 11-year-old hearsay statement from that witness, riddled with numerous correc-
tions and inconsistencies." Kaitlyn Foti, Attorneys React to Bill Cosby Preliminary Hearing
Decision, TIMES HERALD (May 24, 2016, 4:34 PM), http://www.timesherald.com/general-
news/20160524/attorneys-react-to-bill-cosby-preliminary-hearing-decision.
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plurality in Buchanan decided "[w]hile the United States Supreme
Court has not specifically held that the full panoply of constitu-
tional safeguards (i.e., confrontation, cross-examination, and com-
pulsory process) must attend a preliminary hearing, it has inferred
as much in Gerstein v. Pugh."130 However, the inferred right to con-
frontation that the Buchanan plurality inferred from Gerstein was
disapproved by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie just three years earlier.131 A plurality of
the United States Supreme Court in Ritchie held the right of con-
frontation is a trial right, and does not implicate pretrial discov-
ery.132 Additionally, the other jurisdictions which have analyzed
this question have determined the federal right to confrontation
does not prevent the prosecution from advancing past the prelimi-
nary hearing while using only hearsay evidence.133
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially granted Ricker's ap-
peal but later dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted.134
Dismissing the appeal meant that the Superior Court's decision
would continue to be controlling law throughout Pennsylvania. The
dismissal featured a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Saylor and
a dissenting opinion by Justice Wecht. In Saylor's concurring opin-
ion, the Chief Justice recognized the problems associated with al-
lowing hearsay into preliminary hearings could better be addressed
by "refinement in the rulemaking arena"135 given that the court was
presently too "deeply divided concerning the appropriate approach"
for resolving the issue with a constitutional analysis.136
130. Buchanan, 581 A.2d at 175.
131. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54 (1987) (plurality). "The opinions of this
Court show that the right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper re-
strictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination."
Id. Surprisingly, neither the concurrence or dissent in Verbonitz recognized the decision in
Ritchie. See generally Buchanan, 581 A.2d 172.
132. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52. While the decision in Ritchie was only a plurality, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized the Confrontation Clause usually only applies to the
trial. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (finding "[t]he right to confrontation is
basically a trial right").
133. See supra note 99.
134. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2016), appeal dismissed, 170 A.3d 494
(Pa. 2017). The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Saylor recognized that the case "does not
present a suitable vehicle by which to resolve the questions presented" largely because the
prosecution did "not rely exclusively on hearsay in addressing the elements of the crimes
with which [Ricker] was charged." Id. at 495, 501-02 (Saylor, C.J., concurring).
135. For example, Chief Justice Saylor recognized the seemingly contradictory function of
Rule 573(c), which allows the defendant to "cross-examine witnesses", with Rule 573(e),
which states that "[h]earsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an of-
fense." Id. at 507.
136. Id. at 504.
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Justice Wecht filed the sole dissenting opinion and argued that
while the court only granted allocatur 37 to resolve the confronta-
tion clause issue, the court could still legally decide the appeal on
the basis of statutory construction or procedural due process.138 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Wecht recognized that "[t]housands of prelimi-
nary hearings occur across this Commonwealth each year" and that
the Superior Court's decision would consequently be "imposed upon
every defendant in this Commonwealth until the best case arrives
on our doorstep."139
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will likely lack the op-
portunity to address this issue for the foreseeable future.140 On Oc-
tober 26, 2017, shortly after the Supreme Court denied the appeal,
David Ricker pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, drug possession,
and leaving the scene of an accident in exchange for the prosecution
withdrawing the count of attempted homicide and was subse-
quently sentenced to a period of incarceration of five to ten years,
thereby ending his consequential impact on Pennsylvania jurispru-
dence.141
B. The Unavailable Witness Farce
Pennsylvania's laws for preliminary hearings and rules of crimi-
nal procedure allowing use of testimony from preliminary hearings
creates a perverse incentive for defense attorneys to not adequately
represent heir clients by not fully cross-examining witnesses in an-
ticipation that the witness may be unavailable at trial. The current
laws also create an unintended consequence of discouraging
137. The question presented that that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocator
was: "Whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court wrongly held, in a published opinion of first
impression, that a defendant does not have a state or federal constitutional right to confront
the witness against him at a preliminary hearing and that a prima facie case may be proven
by the Commonwealth through hearsay evidence alone, which is what the trial and magiste-
rial district courts concluded in Petitioner's case?" Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 A.3d 175
(Pa. 2016) (emphasis added).
138. Ricker, 170 A.3d at 510-17 (Wecht, J., dissenting). However, a recent Pennsylvania
Superior Court case in Commonwealth v. McClelland decided that neither substantive or
procedural due process rights are violated by allowing hearsay to prove all the elements of
the charged crimes. 165 A.3d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). However, McClelland does carry the
caveat that "[t]his decision does not suggest hat the Commonwealth may satisfy its burden
by presenting the testimony of a mouthpiece parroting multiple levels of rank hearsay." Id.
at 27. Thus, in Pennsylvania there appears to be at least some constitutional limit on the
amount of hearsay that may be used at preliminary hearing.
139. Ricker, 170 A.3d at 509 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
140. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (recognizing the
"[a]ppellant's claim [is] capable of evading review").
141. Matt Miller, East Shore Man Pleads Guilty, Gets Prison Term for Gun Battle with
State Trooper, PENN LIVE (Oct. 26, 2017),
http://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/10/eastshore-man pleads-guiltyg.html.
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prosecutors from objecting to irrelevant questioning in fear that an
objection will prevent the admission of the preliminary hearing tes-
timony at trial if the witness were to become unavailable. The
Pennsylvania rules of evidence permit at trial, as an exception to
the hearsay rule,1 42 the admission of previously recorded testimony
from a preliminary hearing, provided that: (1) the witness respon-
sible for that testimony is presently unavailable; (2) the defendant
had counsel at the preliminary hearing; and (3) the defendant had
a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the
earlier proceeding.1 43 Problems associated with the admission of
preliminary hearing testimony often intersect with the right to
cross-examine under the Pennsylvania Constitution1 4 4 and the
United States Constitution.1 4 5 However, because the credibility of
a witness is not at issue during a preliminary hearing,1 4 6 the nature
of the questions the defense attorneys are allowed to ask change
and a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the declarant can
be inhibited.147
In Pennsylvania, it is difficult to prove that a defendant did not
have an opportunity to fully and fairly cross-examine a witness at
a preliminary hearing. Courts will usually only find a defendant
lacked such an opportunity when the prosecution fails to disclose to
the defense prior to the preliminary hearing that the witness (1)
gave prior inconsistent statements to the police, (2) has a criminal
conviction that is admissible to attack their credibility,14 8 (3) is
142. PA. R. EVID. 802. Hearsay is ordinarily not admissible during a criminal case. Id.;
see also Hearsay rule, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 2010) (stating that the hearsay
rule "declares not admissible as evidence any statement other than that by a witness while
testifying at the [current] hearing and offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted").
143. Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614 A.2d 684, 685 (Pa. 1992).
144. P.A. CONST. art. I, § 9. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be
heard by himself and his counsel . . . [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Id.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." Id. The Confrontation Clause has been interpreted to guarantee the
right to cross-examine witnesses. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
146. Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
147. See, e.g., discussion infra pp. 19-20 and note 146.
148. PA. R. EVID. 609(a). Evidence of prior conviction is admissible "for the purpose of
attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must be admitted if it in-
volved dishonesty or false statement." Id. However, when the criminal conviction is public
record and accessible to the defense, a failure by the prosecution to provide evidence of the
conviction to the defendant prior to the preliminary hearing will not deprive the defendant
of a full and fair opportunity to cross examine witness. Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d
1139, 1148 (Pa. 2005).
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cooperating for a more lenient sentencing,14 9 or (4) is under investi-
gation for the same crime currently being litigated.1 5 0 Ultimately,
what is important is whether "the defense has been denied access
to vital impeachment evidence either at or before the time of the
prior proceeding at which that witness testified."1 5 1 However, a fail-
ure or inability to impeach a witness through other more subjective
means, like questioning perception, memory, or clarity1 5 2 will not
prevent the defendant from being provided the opportunity to fully
and fairly cross-examine a witness.1 5 3
The cases of Commonwealth v. Johnson and Commonwealth v.
Douglas demonstrate how attorneys are required to arbitrarily ask
an undetermined amount of questions, tangentially related to the
witnesses' credibility, in order for the testimony to count as full and
fair opportunity to cross-examine.1 5 4 In Commonwealth v. Johnson,
a murder prosecution relied upon the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony for a witness who was no longer available for
trial.15 5  During the preliminary hearing the defense attorney at-
tempted, and failed, to elicit testimony regarding the credibility of
the key prosecution witness:
BY APPELLEE COUNSEL:
Q. You were aware that Doug had beaten up Vera a number of
times; is that correct?
COMMONWEALTH:
Objection.
THE COURT:
Sustained.
149. Commonwealth v. Smith, 647 A.2d 907, 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
150. Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 614 A.2d 684, 687 (Pa. 1992).
151. Id. at 688. Impeachment is defined as: "to call into question the veracity of the wit-
ness by means of evidence offered for that purpose, or by showing that the witness is unwor-
thy of belief." Impeachment, BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (6th ed. 2010).
152. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
153. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648 A.2d 315, 322 (Pa. 1994) (finding "[t]he Common-
wealth may not be deprived of its ability to present inculpatory evidence at trial merely be-
cause the defendant, despite having the opportunity to do so, did not cross-examine the wit-
ness at the preliminary hearing stage as extensively as he might have done at trial"), abro-
gated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2002).
154. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 737 A.2d 1188 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
758 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
155. Johnson, 758 A.2d at 168.
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BY APPELLEE COUNSEL:
Q. Ma'am, after the separation of Doug and Vera, you were
aware that Doug had beaten up Vera; is that correct?
COMMONWEALTH:
Objection.
THE COURT:
Sustained.
BY APPELLEE COUNSEL:
Q. While Vera was living at your mom's house after the sepa-
ration, did Vera tell you-
THE COURT:
Save it for trial.
BY APPELLEE COUNSEL:
Q. Ma'am, what was your state of mind in regard to Doug and
Vera based upon what Vera had told you?
COMMONWEALTH:
Objection.
THE COURT:
Sustained.156
The defense attorney was asking questions relevant for a trial but
irrelevant for a preliminary hearing, so the Commonwealth ob-
jected, and the court rightly sustained the objections.15 7 At trial,
when this key witness became unavailable, the Commonwealth ad-
mitted the evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony arguing
the defendant was provided a full and fair opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness.15 8 However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
ruled that the testimony was inadmissible because the Common-
wealth continually objected to questions regarding credibility and
156. Id. at 172.
157. Id. at 172.
158. Id. at 170.
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deprived the defendant of the opportunity to fully and fairly cross-
examine the witness.159 This demonstrates how the prosecution
was punished and the defense was rewarded for how they handled
an irrelevant line of questioning.16 0 While the questions bearing on
credibility were not relevant at the preliminary hearing and the
prosecutor was justified in objecting to the line of questioning, the
prosecution was still punished at trial as the testimony was not ad-
missible.
On the other hand, Commonwealth v. Douglas demonstrates how
when the defense attorney elects to not follow a line of questioning
fearing objections from the prosecution, the testimony could still be
admissible at trial.161 This homicide case hinged upon a key witness
to a murder who testified at the preliminary hearing but was later
unavailable at the time of trial.162 In asserting the defendant was
deprived of the opportunity to fully and fairly cross-examine the
witness, the defendant pointed to the following transcript from the
preliminary hearing:
Defense Attorney: Now, you're presently in custody, is that cor-
rect?
McLaurin: Yes.
Defense Attorney: For what?
Prosecutor: Objection.
Defense Attorney: Well, are you awaiting trial or have you been
sentenced?
Court: As to whether he's presently in custody, the objection is
sustained.
Defense Attorney: I'll get it on discovery anyhow.163
This line of questioning was meant to lead towards whether the
witness had pending robbery and burglary charges.164 Because
these preliminary hearing questions bearing upon credibility were
objected to by the prosecutor, the defense attorney abandoned the
159. Id. at 172, 174.
160. Id. at 172, 174; see also Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002) (holding that credibility is not at issue during a preliminary hearing).
161. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 737 A.2d 1188, 1196 (Pa. 1999).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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line of questioning and never asked about the pending charges.165
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the prior testimony
would be admissible because the defense attorney simply "chose not
to pursue that line of questioning."166 Here, the defense attorney
was required to ask questions, which almost certainly would have
been objected to by the prosecutor, for any hope of keeping out he
testimony if the witness were to become unavailable at trial. A de-
fendant will only be considered to have been denied the opportunity
to fully and fairly cross-examine a witness when the court or Com-
monwealth causes the denial.167 Therefore, if the defense attorney
is interested in ensuring the testimony does not become admissible
in the case if the witness becomes unavailable at trial, the defense
attorney is required to ask irrelevant questions bearing on credibil-
ity and be denied an answer.168
C. Probable Cause v. Prima Facie Legal Standard Confusion
Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas and magistrates diminish
the distinction between preliminary arraignments and preliminary
hearings by conflating the probable cause1 69 and prima facie legal
standards.170 In Commonwealth v. Smith the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court conflated prima facie and probable cause by stating "all
that was necessary for the Commonwealth to do was to show a
prima facie case, i.e., sufficient probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed the offense."171 The Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Morman described prima facie as "sufficient
probable cause to believe, that the person charged has committed
the offence stated."172 Even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
described preliminary hearings as requiring "sufficient probable
cause to believe that the person charged has committed the offense
stated."173
The Philadelphia County District Attorney's office implemented
a rearrest policy in 2000, causing further confusion over the prima
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (finding probable cause is a matter of probability
based on whether a prudent person would believe that an individual committed a crime based
on reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances).
170. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1983) (finding a prima facie case
must show "the existence of each of the material elements of the charge is present").
171. Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 A.2d 787, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
172. Commonwealth v. Morman, 541 A.2d 356, 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
173. Wojdak, 466 A.2d at 996.
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facie and probable cause standards.1 7 4 The Philadelphia rearrest
policy stated that if a magistrate dismissed charges at a prelimi-
nary hearing, police could rearrest the suspect, thus subjecting
them to another preliminary arraignment, the need to reacquire
money for bail, and another preliminary hearing.1 7 5 This policy was
likely an attempt by the district attorney to magistrate shop; the
Commonwealth could rearrest until a more prosecution-friendly
magistrate received the case. The legal basis for the District Attor-
ney's practice was based on the idea that since a prima facie case is
a higher standard than a probable cause standard, a magistrate
finding there was not a prima facie case would not preclude an fu-
ture arrest based upon probable cause.17 6 For an example of this
policy, in the Stewart case, a magistrate at a preliminary hearing
dismissed the case because of testimony that, even if believed to be
credible, would not support a conviction as a matter of law.177 De-
spite the magistrate's ruling, the defendant was immediately rear-
rested in the courtroom and jailed for an additional two weeks be-
cause he could not post bail.17 8  Philadelphia's re-arrest policy,
which placed defendants in a legal purgatory, was challenged by a
class action suit which argued the policy violated the Fourth
Amendment because the subsequent arrests were not based upon
probable cause.17 9  The federal district court handling the civil
rights claim against the district attorney's office found that the
Philadelphia District Attorney was "usurping" the role of the mag-
istrate.180 The court reasoned that because the magistrate did not
find a prima facie case and refused to hold the charges for trial, it
was not possible that the re-arrest could be based upon probable
cause. 181
Upon appeal to the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals found that
the re-arrest policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment.18 2 The
court recognized that a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing
created a "different and greater assurance" of guilt than the
174. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2001). The district court could not
discern the difference between probable cause and prima facie. Stewart v. Abraham, No. 00-
2425, 2000 WL 1022958, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
175. Stewart, 275 F.3d at 224.
176. See discussion on difference between probable cause and prima facie supra Section
1I.B.
177. Id. at 236 (McKee, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 236-37.
179. Id. at 224.
180. Stewart v. Abraham, No. 00-2425, 2000 WL 1022958, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
181. Id. at *7. Much of the district court's confusion was likely caused by the "district
Attorney [being] unable to articulate any practical distinction between the terms probable
cause and prima facie case" in briefing the case. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Stewart, 275 F.3d at 231.
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probable cause standard required at preliminary arraignments.1 83
The court reasoned it would be reasonable to re-arrest even if a
magistrate did not find a prima facie case because the probable
cause arrest standard is lower than the magisterial prima facie
standard.184 Just because a higher legal standard was not met, here
the prima facie standard, does not preclude a finding that a lower
standard could be fulfilled, here the probable cause arrest standard.
Further, a prosecutor's determination of probable cause can con-
sider more inadmissible or unadmitted information1 8 5 than the
magistrate's decision for a prima facie case.186 Therefore, because
the re-arrest policy does not violate the 4th Amendment, the pre-
liminary hearing creates a bizarre scenario where the defendant
has everything to lose and no opportunity to win. Even if the de-
fendant does prevent the charges from being held for trial, the de-
fendant can simply be rearrested based on the probable cause from
the initial arrest.18 7
D. Reform Outside of Pennsylvania
The State of Wisconsin acts as a case study for how another state
has called into question the benefits of preliminary hearings. In
2011, a bill was introduced in the Wisconsin legislature seeking to
reform the state's preliminary hearings.1 88 The bill was meant to
streamline the procedure by allowing unlimited use of hearsay.189
Prior to the bill's passage there was considerable debate regarding
the merits of the bill and whether allowing unlimited hearsay would
undermine a defendant's rights by preventing defendants from con-
fronting the testimony of his accusers at preliminary hearings.190
During the debate over the usefulness of the preliminary hearing,
the Wisconsin Attorney General stated he believed reform would
not be appropriate because of a perceived lack of utility in the
183. Id. at 229.
184. Id.
185. Id. Prosecutors can consider any information a reasonable prudent man would con-
sider when determining if probable cause exists for an arrest. McKibben v. Schmotzer, 700
A.2d 484, 492 (Pa. 1997).
186. Stewart, 275 F.3d at 229. A magistrate may only consider legally admissible evidence
at a preliminary hearing. Commonwealth ex. rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 174
(Pa. 1990) (plurality).
187. Stewart, 275 F.3d at 229.
188. S.B. 399, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2011).
189. Id.
190. Joe Forward, Supreme Court Upholds New Law: Hearsay Okay at Preliminary Hear-
ings, STATE BAR OF WIS. (July 10, 2014), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublica-
tions/Pages/General-Article. aspx?ArticleD= 11657.
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preliminary hearing.191 Rather, the Attorney General advocated for
the complete elimination of the preliminary hearing.192 The Attor-
ney General recognized that the preliminary hearing is statutorily
created and is not guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.193
The Attorney General alleged the preliminary hearing was an inef-
ficient system where witnesses were required to be subpoenaed to
multiple proceedings which were often postponed or waived by the
defendant because the threshold for holding charges is so low. 1 94
The Attorney General also argued that by eliminating the prelimi-
nary hearing, the entire criminal prosecution process would be ex-
pedited and the defendant could be provided discovery earlier, be-
cause discovery is usually not provided until after the preliminary
hearing.195 Ultimately, Wisconsin chose to keep the preliminary
hearing and passed the bill allowing unlimited use of hearsay.196
By allowing unlimited use of hearsay, Wisconsin's preliminary
hearing did not provide the defendant with the ability to confront
witnesses and iminished the utility of the preliminary hearing as
a forward looking procedure meant to screen out cases unlikely to
result in a conviction.197 The bill eventually survived a constitu-
tional challenge alleging the bill violated the Confrontation Clause
in a 2014 case before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.198
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES TO PENNSYLVANIA'S PRETRIAL
DETENTION
While there are many problems facing Pennsylvania's pretrial
detention system, preliminary arraignments and preliminary hear-
ings are still great tools for protecting individual rights and ensur-
ing only legitimate cases make it to trial. Rather than abandoning
the preliminary hearing as has been proposed in some jurisdic-
tions,199 legislative reforms to the preliminary hearing could restore
its utility and help prevent defendants from being burdened by a
prosecution unlikely to result in a conviction.
191. John Byron Van Hollen, Wis. Att'y Gen., Remarks to the Senate Committee on Judi-
ciary, Utilities, Commerce, and Government Operations (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Prepared
Remarks].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Forward, supra note 190.
197. See discussion on utility of a forward looking preliminary hearings supra Section
II.A.3.b.
198. State v. O'Brien, 850 N.W.2d 8, 21 (Wis. 2014).
199. Prepared Remarks, supra note 191.
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A. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS FACING PENNSYLVANIA'S PRETRIAL
PROCEDURES
1. Analysis of Use of Hearsay
While confrontation at a preliminary hearing might not be con-
stitutionally required, there are dire consequences for its ab-
sence.200 A lack of confrontation at a preliminary hearing would
undermine the purpose of the preliminary hearing; preliminary
hearings should ensure accused individuals are not unnecessarily
burdened by a prosecution unlikely to succeed on its merits.201 Ad-
mission of hearsay flips the purpose of the preliminary hearing from
a forward looking hearing procedure into another backward hear-
ing procedure.202 If confrontation of witnesses is not required at this
early portion of the criminal procedure, the preliminary hearing is
essentially fulfilling the same function as the preliminary arraign-
ment, to act as a backwards looking hearing, only determining if
the initial arrest was justified.203 The preliminary hearing will fail
to ascertain if the prosecution is likely to succeed in near trial like
conditions.204
In the Ricker case, if hearsay was not allowed at the preliminary
hearing, the prosecution would have struggled to advance the case
past the preliminary hearing considering Trooper Trotta's history
of dishonesty.205 But under Pennsylvania's current law, because
Trooper Trotta's prerecorded testimony described the elements of
the crimes necessary to advance Ricker's preliminary hearing, the
prosecution could merely play the prerecorded statement, denying
the defendant the ability to cross-examine Trooper Trotta poten-
tially showing Ricker's shooting was in self-defense. A completely
incredible witness like Trooper Trotta can have his version of events
played over a tape to fulfill each element of a crime and magistrates
are not allowed to weigh the credibility of the prerecorded
200. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The Court found that confrontation:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him
with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a
penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; (3) permits the jury that is to
decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his state-
ment, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
201. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 783-84.
202. Id. at 780.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Miller, supra note 116.
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statements.206 Under the current law, the preliminary hearing is
essentially a rubberstamp for the prosecution and fails to evidence
the prosecution's chances for success beyond what is proven at the
preliminary arraignment. The usefulness of the preliminary hear-
ing is questionable especially considering the high social-economic
costs it creates for defendants.207 In addition to monetary costs
where defendants are required to pay for attorneys, if defendants
miss a preliminary hearing their bond will be forfeited and they will
be sent back to jail.
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court elected not to decide
the issue, the limitless use of hearsay will continue to be allowed
and drastically undermine the utility of the preliminary hearing.208
As previously discussed, Pennsylvania's preliminary hearing is a
forward looking procedure meant to ensure the prosecution is rea-
sonably likely to succeed at trial.209 By allowing a case to advance
past the preliminary hearing when the prosecution has only intro-
duced hearsay evidence, it is difficult to argue only those likely to
be convicted would have their cases held for trial.
2. Analysis of Unavailability of Witnesses
Under the current legal regime, a level of gamesmanship is intro-
duced into the legal system where prosecutors must selectively
choose when to object, on the basis of relevance, to a defense attor-
ney's questioning regarding credibility. Prosecutors are encouraged
to not play by the rules of evidence and allow irrelevant cross-ex-
amination in order to not preclude the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony if the witness becomes unavailable at trial.210
Similarly, defense attorneys are encouraged to question witnesses
on a topic completely irrelevant to a preliminary hearing, credibil-
ity, and any of this testimony can be introduced if the witnesses
testify inconsistently at trial.211 Since the purpose of the prelimi-
nary hearing is not to establish credibility, the threat of an objection
206. Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that a
preliminary hearing magistrate is not empowered to make credibility determination).
207. FIFTH JUD. DISTRICT PA. ANN. REP. (2014), https://www.alleghenycourts.us/down-
loads/Annualo20Reports/2014.pdf. In Allegheny County in 2014 alone, 983 bond forfeitures
occurred as a result of an individual misting their preliminary hearing. Id.
208. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
209. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 779.
210. See also supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
211. PA. R. EVID. 804.
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whenever a question even remotely relating to credibility is asked
hangs over the heads of defense attorneys.212
If a prosecutor were to anticipate the witness was unlikely to ap-
pear at trial, either because of old age, sickness, or a reputation for
being unreliable, the prosecutor could purposefully not object to
questions on credibility and the defendant could be deprived of the
opportunity to confront the witness at trial. However, if the prose-
cutor anticipates the defendant will be available at trial, the prose-
cutor will be required to object to any question bearing upon credi-
bility or the witness may be subjected to impeachment at trial for
testifying inconsistently.213 As a result, the preliminary hearing is
a charade where the defense attorney is obligated to ask questions
outside of the scope of the hearing, the prosecutor is obligated to
object to those questions, and the magistrate is obligated to grant
the objection.2 14 This type of gamesmanship is unbecoming and
unfitting for a fair legal system and should be discouraged as it un-
dermines the justice system and cross-examination as a tool for dis-
covering the truth.2 15
3. Analysis of Probable Cause v. Prima Facie Legal Stand-
ard Confusion
If courts are unclear on the definitions of prima facie and proba-
ble cause, the reason for two distinct pretrial probability of guilt
determinations is drastically undermined. The probable cause de-
termination being made at a preliminary arraignment is supposed
to demonstrate the arrest was justified and that there is a likely
probability the arrestee committed the crime.216 In contrast, a
prima facie determination is required at the preliminary hearing
because by requiring each element of a crime to be shown, the pre-
liminary hearing should eliminate cases fatally flawed where a re-
quired element to a crime cannot be proven.217 The incremental
increase in the burden of proof required to be shown by the prose-
cution helps justify prolonged pretrial incarceration. 218 A failure
to appreciate the distinction between the two procedures
212. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
213. PA. R. EVID. 613. A witness may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent state-
ment made by the witness to impeach the witness's credibility. Id.
214. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douglas, 737 A.2d 1188, 1196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
215. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination as
"the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
216. The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, supra note
54, at 776.
217. Id. at 779.
218. Id. at 784.
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undermines the preliminary arraignment's purpose as a backwards
looking procedure meant to determine whether the arrest was jus-
tified and the preliminary hearing as a forward looking procedure,
ensuring individuals are not needlessly dragged through the crimi-
nal justice system in a case destined to fail at trial.219
B. Proposed Reforms for Pennsylvania
Reforms to Pennsylvania's preliminary hearing should revolve
around making the preliminary hearing more like a real trial.220 In
order to restore the utility of preliminary hearings, the Pennsylva-
nia legislature could eliminate the use of hearsay at preliminary
hearings. Additionally, the legislature could allow magistrates to
consider a witness's credibility while testifying at a preliminary
hearing. Finally, grand juries should see greater use to avoid the
embarrassing hassle of being criminally investigated.
Legislatively eliminating the use of hearsay at preliminary hear-
ings would instantly resolve many of the issues plaguing the pre-
liminary hearing. A legislative solution is probably the only poten-
tial solution because, as previously discussed, the Confrontation
Clause is only a trial right and not a pretrial right.221 The use of
hearsay at preliminary hearings in Pennsylvania is purely statu-
tory construction and consequently could be restricted by the legis-
lature.222 While eliminating the use of hearsay would increase the
burden on the prosecution in preparing for preliminary hearings, it
would also ensure the prosecution is not required to prepare for trial
for a case unlikely to succeed. As a compromise with the prosecu-
tion for a more stringent preliminary hearing, the legislature could
extend the deadline for being required to prove a prima facie case
at a preliminary hearing.223 By expanding the period of time for the
prosecution to prepare for a preliminary hearing, the prosecution
could ensure that the witnesses who would actually testify. By
passing these reforms, the legislature could ensure a more trial-like
and forward-looking preliminary hearing, allowing prosecutors to
focus on cases likely to result in a conviction.
219. Id. at 775-76, 779.
220. See supra note 135 (describing how Chief Justice Saylor of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court called for "refinement in the rulemaking arena" in light of the Richer decision).
221. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54 (1987) (plurality).
222. PA. R. CRIM. P. 542.
223. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 540. Currently, preliminary hearings must be scheduled within
fourteen days if the defendant is incarcerated and twenty-one days if the defendant posted
bail. Id.
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Another legislative solution to reform to the preliminary hearing
would be to allow magistrates to consider the credibility of wit-
nesses. Currently, magistrates are not allowed to consider the cred-
ibility of witnesses unless the witness is patently unbelievable.22 4
By allowing a magistrate to consider the credibility of a witness the
preliminary hearing would share more similarities with a trial. Al-
lowing magistrates to recognize the weakness of a case based on the
lack of credibility in testifying witnesses would allow weak cases to
be dismissed or worked out at an earlier stage in the criminal pro-
ceedings. Additionally, because the burden at the preliminary
hearing is still a relatively low prima facie standard, the consider-
ation of credibility would not be a major hindrance to prosecutions.
Allowing consideration of credibility at preliminary hearings would
allow magistrates to not hold the charges for trial, thus saving de-
fendants from the burden of pretrial detention.
Finally, the use of indicting grand juries could be greatly ex-
panded in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's current use of grand juries
is greatly limited because they are only allowed to be used when
witnesses are being intimidated.2 2 5 A movement towards the ex-
pansion of indicting grand juries would encourage witnesses to tes-
tify without the coercive pressures of witness intimidation that oc-
curs in an open court proceeding like a preliminary hearing. Addi-
tionally, the secretiveness of grand juries would save the innocently
accused from the humiliation of being publicly accused of a crime,
when no such crime has occurred. All three of these reforms could
be accomplished through legislative action and could potentially
save individuals time from being erroneously accused of a crime,
and save the Commonwealth money from wasted prosecution costs.
V. CONCLUSION
Preliminary hearings in Pennsylvania are not protecting the in-
nocent. Constitutional jurisprudence on pretrial detention does not
provide an adequate basis for protecting defendants from unjust
prosecutions. In Pennsylvania, the use of hearsay at preliminary
hearings and the confusing distinction between probable cause and
prima facie undermines the utility of the preliminary hearing as a
forward looking pretrial procedure. Additionally, magistrates not
weighing credibility at preliminary hearings adds a sense of
224. Liciaga v. Lehigh County, 566 A.2d 246, 251 (Pa. 1989) (citing Pennsylvania Bench-
book for Criminal Proceedings, Preliminary Hearing -- Procedure in Court Cases, § I., 5 at
II-G- 19, Scope of the Defense Presentation & Cross-Examination, (Pennsylvania Conference
of State Trial Judges 1986)).
225. PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.
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gamesmanship not warranted in the truth-finding mission of the
criminal justice system. Presently, resources on prolonged prosecu-
tions are wasted when cases can easily survive a preliminary hear-
ing, but are likely to fail at trial.
Pennsylvania can resolve many of these problems by legislatively
excluding hearsay from preliminary hearings and allowing magis-
trates to consider the credibility of witnesses. Preliminary hearings
will be drastically more useful compared to their current role as a
prosecutorial rubberstamp. Additionally, an expanded use of grand
juries could entirely avoid many of the problems associated with
preliminary hearings. By implementing these reforms and remem-
bering the preliminary hearing's role as a forward looking screening
procedure, purposeless incarcerations of individuals like Kalief
Browder can be avoided.
